Email info@fintechfail.com
What Wise Failed to Stop: Full Transaction Timeline
“Every fraudulent charge generated a fee for Wise.
While I was unconscious, Wise made money.”
This is a forensic breakdown of every unauthorized transaction — tap payments, wire transfers, and currency conversions — all pulled directly from Wise’s own platform.
I have the official Wise transaction records, bank statements, card activity logs, and screenshots.
Every entry is timestamped, documented, and previously submitted to Wise support.
Wise claims they reviewed it — and said they found “It was not detected that there were any irregularities or any signs of security breach..”
If this isn’t irregular… what is?
This is a snapshot of 32 transactions across six currencies—tap payments, currency exchanges, and wire transfers—all approved and profited from by Wise.
Keep in mind this all happened over four hours.
Every yellow highlight marks a separate transaction. For a more detailed breakdown, scroll down click the link at the bottom of this page.
“Every one of these entries came from Wise’s own system, if freezing a card doesn’t stop wire transfers, what does?”
Christopher Carson
The tap payments. The currency drains. The wire transfers.
Saturday October 5th, 2024
22:19 Google Pay Tap Card- 5850
22:46 - Google Pay Tap Card 5850
23:11 - Google Pay Tap (DECLINED) - Card 5850
23:12 - Google Pay Tap - Card 6246
One minute after card 5850 was declined, there was another card used. This also was not flagged as irregular activity, and the fraud continued.
23:42 Google Pay Tap - Card 8216
Sunday October 6, 2024
00:01 Google Pay Tap :— Card 5850 Declined
This should of triggered a immediate shut down of my account in full.
00:01 Card created (digitally) Card 0128
00:02 Card frozen Card 0128
Somehow, this was still considered not “irregular activity” by Wise.
Currency Conversions 3:00 am - 3:03 am
Two minutes later the third wire transfer for over $10,000 CDN was made.
No human review. No account freeze. No security intervention.
I have statements available that show all the currency. exchanges between 6 currencies. They even cleaned out ” rainy day fund”.
6x rapid currency exchanges between CHF, USD, EUR, CZK, CDN and HUF.
Used to convert balances into USD ahead of wire transfers.
These conversions are critical to understanding how Wise systems failed to halt abnormal behavior.
Wire Transfers
Each of these transfers was made after the card freeze and multiple declined tap attempts and the six rapid currency exchanges in 3 minutes to the USD account— yet none were flagged or blocked by Wise. All were sent to the same recipient as the Google Pay transactions: WIRTUOSO SP Z O O.
I contacted Wise at 09:42 AM on Sunday, October 6th, urgently requesting that the wire transfers be stopped. They went through anyway.
12:18 AM Sunday-Oct 6, 2024 - Wire Transfer #1
Amount: 5,653 GBP (approx. 10,428.68 CAD).
2:01 AM - Sunday, Oct 6, 2024, - Wire Transfer #2
Amount: £2,496.32 GBP (approx. $4605.22 CAD).
3:05 AM - Sunday, Oct 6, 2024, - Wire Transfer #3
Amount: £5,427.50 GBP (approx. $10,012.68 CDN).
Wise Refunded £1,059 — Then Closed the Case
After allowing Tap Payments of over $1,556.80 CDN then three high-value wire transfers totaling over £13,500 GBP. Wise refunded me £1,059.62 — and then closed the case.
210.99 GBP refunded on October 16, 2024
848.63 GBP refunded on October 23, 2024
Total: £1,059.62 GBP
These were partial recoveries from the receiving Revolut account, and Wise confirmed in writing that this was “all that could be recovered.”
“We have received a partial refund... unfortunately the rest of the funds were already withdrawn.”
Wise Support - November 12th, 2024
"We need to thoroughly review this... these investigations may take several days." — Wise Support "We found nothing unusual." (same email, next sentence)
Wise Support - October 10th, 2024
This is what FinTech Fail looks like.
"The system did not stop the transfers as there was no indication these were fraudulent. "
Wise Support
If there was nothing irregular… why return anything? That’s a massive contradiction — you don’t return money unless there’s a reason.
No SIM, No Data — So How Did They Do It?
At the time of the fraud, I did not have a Polish SIM card in my phone. I had only been in Krakow for a few hours. My Czech SIM stopped working as soon as I crossed the border. I wasn’t connected to any mobile network — and didn’t buy a Polish SIM until two days later.
This matters. Because while tap payments through Google Pay can function offline (briefly), the rest cannot:
Adding a new Wise card
Accessing the Wise app
Sending wire transfers
Converting currencies across six accounts
All of that requires an internet connection.
"I had no service. Wise had all the signals. And they still let it go through."
Christopher Carson
So how did it happen?
Whoever accessed my device connected it to Wi-Fi — most likely their own. That’s how they created a new card, cleared my balances through multiple conversions, and sent out three wire transfers — all while I was unconscious.
Instead of blocking or investigating, Wise approved every action.
This isn’t just a failure to protect my funds —
"It’s a failure to even question how these actions were technically possible."
Christopher Carson
Want to share your story —
or join the fight for accountability?
If you've experienced unauthorized transactions or
inadequate support from Wise, you're not alone.
“I didn’t spend this money. I spent the last six months recovering from what it cost me.”
Christopher Carson
FintechFail.com exists to expose systemic weaknesses in digital finance platforms —
and hold them accountable when lives are affected.
Have a similar experience?
I want to hear your story. Share it [here] or email me directly at [info@fintechfail.com].